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Stories with a good pinch of irony often reveal how and where an ideal is 
caught up by reality. We begin this paper about decision theory with such 
an example: Jane, a scholar in this discipline, goes to her favorite teahouse 
to have her 4 o’clock tea and a piece of cake as always. The waiter offers her 
the choice of the day: ‘Today we have on our menu: apple tart, blueberry 
muffin, and cheese cake.’ Jane decides for the first, apple tart. However, 
after a couple of minutes, the waiter comes back to tell her that he had for-
gotten to mention that there is lemon pie, too. ‘In that case,’ Jane answers 
after a moment, ‘I’ll take the cheese cake1.’ 
Although the punchlines of well-told anecdotes are supposed to be 
self-evident, I hope the reader will excuse my insistence to elaborate. We 
can infer from Jane choosing apple tart (a) among the initial set of alterna-
tive choices, that is, apple tart (a), blueberry muffin (b), or cheese cake (c), 
that she prefers a over the other choices. The introduction of a new option 
in the set, the lemon cake in this case, should not overturn Jane’s initial 
choice a unless the new option is preferred to a itself. However, this is not 
what happened: we would surely not expect Jane to choose c given the 
preference she revealed first (a over either b or c). This is the ideal of what 
is considered rational behavior, namely, respecting transitivity in choice 
behavior – and the punchline of the above mentioned anecdote suggests 
that decision theorists, who deal with this ideal professionally, have the 
least confidence in it. 
And yet the cake anecdote (henceforth CA) is relevant beyond the 
definite boundaries of a specific academic discipline. In everyday life, it is 
not uncommon to change one’s opinion within different timespans and as 
a function of the information at one’s disposal. For instance, Jane might – 
intuitively, perhaps – change her opinion on whether to take an umbrella 
with her on a cloudy day, what party or politician to vote for, or what 
partner to spend her life with (if this is a choice she is considering at all). 
In such contexts, it is not counter-intuitive that Jane attributes different 
utilities to the possible outcomes. That is, she she asks herself which situ-
ation, that would result from her action, she would prefer more that its 
alternatives given what she knows now about the weather, politics, or her 
partner. In doing so, she could eventually rank the different implications 
of her choices in a preference ordering. With regard to the second example, 
she might prefer to live in a quite egalitarian society rather than in a liberal 
welfare state which in turn she prefers to a libertarian meritocratic system. 
As a consequence, Jane would probably vote for parties on the left, rather 
than the right, end of the political spectrum. Moreover, we would expect 
Jane to stick to her voting behavior in similar conditions given her prefer-
ence ordering. So, where does intransitivity enter the picture such that 
even non-adepts of decision theory might enjoy the punchline of our CA?
Imagine that Jane changes her political view and votes for a conserva-
tive party. The mere observation of Jane’s changed voting behavior will 
appear inconsistent and thus intransitive to us. It would appear intransi-
tive because her initial preference ordering concerning political systems 
is overthrown, and the initially least preferred option is suddenly chosen 
(and thus factually preferred). Obviously, one might say, context matters 
and her preferences are not unalterable. Jane’s life circumstances might 
have changed. Imagine for instance that she has got tenure at a prestigious 
institution. She now feels for the first time the disincentivizing impact 
that progressive taxation has on labour and adapts her voting behavior 
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accordingly. However, the underlying question still stands: how are we 
to understand Jane’s change of opinion, utility ranking, and preference 
from an outside perspective – while we are unfamiliar with her personal 
conditions? To illustrate this, suppose an old friend of Jane – who has 
not seen her in a while – gets to know what party she voted for. It is not 
too far-fetched that Jane’s behavior (given her initial preferences) appears 
irrational from his perspective. The point here is that the decision theo-
rist (or any other social scientist) is in a position similar to that of Jane’s 
friend: certain givens and details about Jane are not available to him or 
simply not taken into account. The crux for both, old friends and scientists 
alike, is how to deal with preference changes during a period of interest 
for personal (the old friend) or scientific (the social scientist) purposes. 
More generally, how should we accommodate the fact that people (and 
their preferences) change over time? It is this difficulty that the initial CA 
illustrates and condenses into a preference change that happened within a 
couple of minutes. The underlying problem of both examples is the same.
Am I making too much fuss about an unavoidable fact of human exist-
ence? Jane, it seems, changed her opinions and preferences for the available 
options in view of new information or altered life circumstances. In fact, 
this is precisely what I want to argue for in this paper: Jane’s changed 
behavior is not necessarily irrational and an effort should be made to inter-
pret and consider seemingly intransitive changes in behavior in accordance 
with our theory of rational choice. Its rationality can be preserved by refin-
ing our – or the decision theorist’s – assessment of Jane’s specific choice and 
her underlying motivational considerations2. The strategy that I suggest to 
‘repair’ the irrationality of Jane’s choice for c is to describe the choices 
more accurately, that is, according to their specific context. Basically, we 
need to acknowledge that various factors could explain Jane’s seemingly 
intransitive choice, for instance that her new job changed her political 
preferences. With regard to the initial CA, she might have had reliable rea-
sons to believe that this would be the last time that c was available – after 
years of patronage of this teahouse, she knows that always when a new 
dessert option is offered for the first time (now, the lemon cake) the option 
that has featured on the menu the longest (c in this case) won’t be served 
anymore the next day. Obviously, these aspects change the preference-rel-
evant nature of option c such that it can be re-described as c*, where the 
asterisk indicates the (new) knowledge of the cheese cake being offered for 
the last time. Although her preference ordering was a over b over c, we can 
now adopt an updated ordering in light of the new information without a 
violation of the principle of transitivity: c* over a over b.
Thus, a refinement of the choice-description seems required in order 
to assess the rationality of an action properly. However, this strategy – as 
uncontroversial as it might seem – is not without problems. According to 
decision theorist and economist Paul Anand (1990), the re-description 
of a choice according to a specific context is arbitrary and leads to an 
insurmountable paradox. The issue is this: reasoning along the lines of re-
description can warrant intransitive conclusions of prima facie transitive 
choice behavior too. For instance, if Jane abided with a instead of tak-
ing c, then the choice would be transitive according to our observation. 
However, if she was supposed to know about c becoming c* at that point 
(and we, from the outside, knew about the underlying relevant informa-
tion), then her ultimate choice for a would nevertheless be intransitive 
because it did not respect the eventual preference ordering c* over a and 
a over b. Obviously, our conclusion depends on a clear definition (and 
thus description) of the specific choice options (including the type of 
information taken into account) and their preference ordering before we 
assess the rationality of her choice. However, we cannot define the set 
of variables that underlie and inform the choice description while also 
allowing for re-descriptions of choices according to an indefinite amount 
of additional factors. For Anand, the absence of a clear prior definition 
of these elements makes it impossible to give a conclusive assessment of 
the rationality of a choice – an initially irrational choice might become 
rational (and vice versa) in light of evidence we discover long after the 
choice was made. Re-descriptions are arbitrary: fundamentally, there are 
no clear boundaries or criteria to decide on what counts as a legitimate 
re-description.
In view of such arbitrariness, Anand (1990) rejects the possibility of 
re-descriptions to accommodate seemingly intransitive choices. In section 
2, where his overall position is described in greater detail, we will see that 
his argument is based on a general critical attitude towards transitivity. 
In section 3, I shall indicate pathways for preserving transitivity while 
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contesting Anand’s rejection of re-description based on two considera-
tions. Firstly, his position depends on a division between descriptive and 
normative decision theory, which I deem unrealistic. Secondly, his posi-
tion presupposes that observable choice and revealed preference are the 
only criteria on the basis of which options can be described. This, in turn, 
undermines the possibility of preserving transitivity by describing choice 
in terms of motivationally salient and potentially unobservable considera-
tions of the agent. Therefore, I will argue that descriptions that include 
these terms are not necessarily arbitrary. In section 4, finally, the findings 
of this paper are briefly summarized.
2. Is there any normative appeal to transitivity?
2.1 The psychological justification
In his 1990 paper3, Anand mainly focuses on the normative importance 
and legitimacy of the axiomatic method in the social sciences. Axioms 
allow us to model and imitate the relevant factors of real world behavior. 
They define the nature of the objects of study as well as the relationships 
among them. Anand emphasizes two definitional elements of the axiomatic 
method. The first element is what he calls ‘choice primitives’ – the objects 
or outcomes which are compared and assessed according to the axioms. In 
our example these are the types of dessert choice, represented by a, b, c, 
or c*. The second element of the axiomatic method consists of the nature 
of the preference relation among these choice primitives – determining, 
for instance, whether they have to be ordered in a transitive manner or 
not. What matters for our purposes is that Anand is rather critical of the 
way axioms are used and justified in concrete scientific practice: he claims 
that both elements of the axiomatic method are unfounded, at best ‘only 
partially (or un-)interpreted’ (Anand, 1990: 91, italics in the original)4, and 
hence underdeveloped. According to him, in order for the model – which 
is ultimately defined by its axioms – to have normative appeal, the axioms 
need to be justified separately. The nature of the choice primitives, their 
characteristics and the stipulated relations among them need to be relevant 
and legitimate on their own. By what criterion can we determine whether 
the information we consider in our choices is the best candidate? How can 
we test whether transitivity is the optimal manner to judge the rationality 
of preferences?
Anand himself is critical of the normative appeal of transitivity. His 
attitude and implicit motivation5 should be seen in the context of the 
advent of the experimental approach in the social sciences (predominantly 
in economics). Historically, Maurice Allais (1953) was one of the first social 
scientists to test axioms empirically. He provided empirical evidence that 
undermined some classical requirements of rational choice theory such 
as transitivity. What he observed was a ‘certainty bias’: if Jane – assuming 
that she was a representative participant in Allais’ experiments – displayed 
a (slight) preference of a over b and if she was offered b for sure and a with 
a (high) probability she would choose b. However, in an analogous case, 
if b and a were both unsure outcomes and if the difference in probability 
between them was the same as in the first case, it would turn out that Jane 
would have chosen a6. Such a result violates transitivity because the prefer-
ence relation between a and b changes although the preference-relevant 
information, that is, the difference in probability of the outcomes, stays 
the same7. The upshot of this critical tendency towards transitivity is illus-
trated best with a quote by Peter C. Fisher (Fisher, 1991: 29): ‘The sanctity 
of transitivity as a bulwark of rationality and order will gradually erode, 
but this will take time.’8
This is the wider context of the empirical challenge brought forward 
against transitivity. In light of such findings, one might consider whether 
axioms like transitivity could be maintained on normative grounds instead 
– asking whether agents should act according to the axioms. Addressing 
this question in his 1990 paper, Anand discusses the ‘Psychological View of 
Normative Appeal (PVNA)’ of the axiomatic method. In his view,
[...] we should employ axioms because they describe propositions which 
we could easily accept. (Anand, 1991: 93, emphasis added)
Axioms like transitivity seem to reflect an intuition we have about ration-
ality: it seems counterintuitive to consider a genuinely inconsistent (for 
our purposes this implies: intransitive) choice as rational. Behavior that 
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consistently violates any ordered and reconstructible pattern does not 
seem to warrant attributing rationality to it. Traceability and predict-
ability go along with our common concept of rationality – we want to 
understand the underlying reasoning that motivated a choice before we 
call it rational9. However, whether a specific choice is transitive or not 
depends crucially on the specific way this choice is framed, expressed, and 
described. Ultimately, any difference in the description of choice behavior 
will have an impact on its normative content too, just like the distinction 
made between c and c* in Jane’s choice did. The more convincing the 
underlying ‘story’ about the construction and description of the primitives 
is, the more normative appeal the latter have. 
Besides the arbitrariness of descriptions I alluded to in the introduc-
tion, there is a more fundamental problem, according to Anand. In the 
PVNA justification of axioms, the description of the primitives depends 
on its specific wording – its ‘intensionality’ (Anand, 1990: 93). However, 
it undermines the reason the axiomatic approach is used in the first place: 
we postulate and use simplifying axioms in order to deductively define 
rationality and thereby account for a multitude of concrete occurrences. 
Axioms like transitivity serve as the premises of the deductive argument. 
And from their truth follows the truth of the consequence, that is, the 
attribute of being rational for all situations where the axioms hold. Such 
an argument, however, is ‘extensional’ (Anand, 1990: 93) and independent 
of specific wording. To justify the use of axioms in terms of their PVNA, 
then, undermines this very deductive advantage. Every specific application 
of the axiom will have to be assessed separately in terms of accuracy of 
description. To use the words of Anand: 
While PNVA gives weight to cognitive factors […] it provides no 
grounds for the extensionality on which the use of axioms is based, and 
can only be regarded as ultimately self-defeating. (Anand, 1990: 93)
I wonder whether this is not too harsh and categorical a conclusion. 
Although the elaboration of my criticism with regard to his conclusion 
shall only begin at the very end of this section, we may already state that 
Anand’s evaluative framework is clear-cut and strict: axioms have to apply 
independent of context or language. For this reason, it is necessary to 
define the domain and primitives to which the axioms apply before we 
assess specific situations. This, however, excludes re-descriptions after the 
fact, that is, once the behavior or choice in question has already taken 
place.
2.2 The translation theorem
In the further development of Anand’s argument, he presents a formal 
proof of the arbitrariness of (re-)descriptions on the basis of what he calls 
the ‘translation theorem’: 
All intransitive behaviours can be redescribed in such a way the transitivity 
is not violated and all transitive behaviours can be redescribed in such a 
way that transitivity is violated. (Anand, 1990: 94) 
The proof basically formalizes our initial example of arbitrary re-descrip-
tion. Whether Jane violates transitivity or not, whether she acts irrationally 
or not, depends on the description of the choice primitives one chooses. 
The theorem states that the (re-)description does not depend on the behav-
ior itself: Jane’s choice c might be ‘translated’ into any other primitive c*, 
c^, etc. depending on the context, information, and hence description of 
the choice taken into account. But, Anand asks, is it legitimate to look 
for a ‘better’ description of Jane’s choice after she has taken her decision 
already, that is, after the fact?
This is where the arbitrariness of re-description resides: 
Without prior agreement on the linguistic conventions which will be 
used to say what counts as a particular choice primitive, we can choose, 
ex post facto, some convention (richness of language permitting) in such 
a way that an observation (set) can be counted, either as a violation 
of transitivity or any other axiom [footnote suppressed] which we are 
testing, or not, depending on choice. (Anand, 1990: 96)
According to Anand, this arbitrariness is problematic. If we do not possess 
a definition of the set of choice primitives before we apply it to a con-
crete case, contradictions or an ad hoc theory will result. This is intuitively 
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plausible: in assessing a choice situation normatively (asking ‘what is the 
rational thing to do for Jane?’), I must know beforehand what choices Jane 
might face and what information she has about them – adding or ‘invent-
ing‘ choices, or descriptions thereof, after the fact seems a patching ad 
hoc measure violating the requirement of completeness. Indeed, complete-
ness is a precondition for transitivity10: without presuming that all possible 
choices are known, without a complete set of primitives, any discussion of 
transitivity is senseless as another choice may always ‘pop up’ and intervene 
with the established preference ordering.
Is there no way to avoid this problem? Anand mentions a ‘consequen-
tialist’ option to deal with it. On this account, the choice primitives are 
defined with reference to what the agent perceives as her choice. Anand 
summarizes such a position in the following manner:
[...] if the agent derives utility over something – if it is of “concern” to the 
individual as Savage put it – then, whatever it is, it should be modelled as 
part of the utility-yielding primitive. (Anand, 1990: 97)
Likewise, with regard to the example of Jane, we could say that whatever 
the preference-relevant context, consideration, or information, it has to be 
reflected in the way we construct the choice primitives. But, if any yielded 
utility to the agent had to be incorporated into the description of the 
choice primitives, then it would be impossible to assess whether the axi-
oms are respected or not, whether the agent acted rationally according to 
those axioms or not. This is what Anand was interested in in the first place, 
testing axioms or assessing their normative appeal (cf. Anand, 1990: 97). 
If the agent was to have, say, a deliberate preference for intransitivity, it 
would of course be pointless to try to assess the transitivity of the actions. 
If Jane had chosen c only because she derived utility from deviating from 
predictions by rational choice theory, what sense would it make to ask – 
with regard to the axioms we postulate – whether this was a rational choice 
or not? For Anand, basing the description of the choice primitives on the 
agent’s internal state is ultimately incompatible with normative assessment 
of choices, and with the very project of axiom testing.
2.3 Two objectives of decision theory
Accounts like the one above are thus in danger of producing absurd 
implications because they endorse ‘pre-axiomatic proposals for primi-
tive constructing’ (Anand, 1990: 97). If the agent’s utility determines the 
structure of the axioms, then the very reason to use axioms is subverted. 
Although theoretically possible, such a consequentialist solution to the 
arbitrariness-charge would be ‘rather costly’ in terms of 
[...] effects on the objectives which decision theorists set out to achieve 
(in particular the aims of providing a theory with behavioural content 
and one which is “hands-off” [...] (Anand, 1990: 97)
Now, what does Anand mean with ‘behavioural content’ and ‘‘hands-
off’’? This distinction is crucial, since Anand argues against the compatibility 
of the two objectives that are pursued in decision theory: the descriptive 
and the normative objective. The underlying idea is this. In decision theory, 
we are aiming at, on the one hand, a descriptive account of the ways peo-
ple eventually make their decisions on a factual level. And such an account 
needs to simplify, explain or even predict the concrete behavior in ques-
tion – it has to have ‘behavioural content’. According to this objective, the 
decisions theorist aims to obtain an appropriate and realistic description of 
the choice – and the previous discussion of Anand’s translation theorem 
applies to such an approach. On the other hand, however, we are looking 
for an independent and convenient tool or benchmark against which actual 
behavior can be normatively assessed without the decision theorist having to 
look at every specific case (‘hands-off’). On this account, the re-description 
of choices does not need further argument, as the primitives need to be 
determined upfront. Evidently, Anand’s criticism of re-descriptions after the 
fact presupposes this normative objective of decision theory.
So, what is the relation between the two objectives or approaches? 
Interestingly, with regard to the differences in primitive construction, 
Anand states on the one hand: 
Solving simultaneously for the twin objectives of being “hands-off” and 
providing content is akin to squaring the circle. (Anand, 1990: 100)
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However, he seems to make a concession which is at odds with his own 
argument: ‘Both projects seem to be reasonable ones to follow…’ (Anand, 
1990: 99). It is hard to see how the descriptive objective is supposed to be 
‘reasonable’ in light of the challenge the translation theorem poses to it. 
Or, if the project can be somehow reasonable, will there be a criterion that 
ensures that (re-)descriptions are not arbitrary? Although Anand is not 
explicit about that, I want to argue for the affirmative answer to this ques-
tion in the following section. 
3. Getting the ‘hands-on’ description right
3.1 The interdependence of the two objectives
Let us start with a fundamental question straight away: why do we talk 
about the concrete normative appeal of axioms when they are artificially 
posited with the intention to serve a purely deductive purpose? The dis-
cussion of the axiomatic method is basically motivated by the observation 
of recurrent prima facie violations of those very axioms. The experimen-
tal results, presented first by Allais and subsequently widely confirmed, 
speak clearly against the axiom of transitivity in preference orderings (as 
displayed through choices). But intuitively, it is doubtful whether agents 
simply act irrationally on a systematic and widespread scale and thereby 
violate an axiom as important as transitivity. So, if we do not want to bite 
the bullet that humans consistently act irrationally, two different strategies 
are open to us: either we check whether rationality – as defined by the 
posited axioms – might apply to the undertaken actions in another man-
ner, or, we ask whether those very axioms do indeed represent the best way 
for normatively assessing our behavior. I will defend the former strategy 
in the following pages, whereas Anand emphasizes the latter approach to 
axiom testing.
Experimental evidence is descriptive and hence inductive; it is based 
on concrete outcomes or choices. As such, it is brought forward against the 
normative conclusions of an axiom-based deductive approach. The point 
is that Anand’s discussion of how axioms should be tested presupposes 
the interdependence of the two projects, the descriptive-inductive and the 
normative-deductive. It does so to the extent that it takes evidence from 
the empirical approach as a motivation and justification to scrutinize the 
validity of the axiomatic approach. Although Anand’s two objectives are 
ultimately connected, he presents them as two independent goals. How-
ever, it is insufficient to declare a seemingly axiom-violating behavior as 
irrational merely on the basis of a prima facie observation: to call Jane’s 
choice c straightforwardly irrational simply because she preferred a over c 
at would undermine the requirements of the descriptive approach. By bar-
ring any options that would preserve rationality, such a conclusion about 
Jane’s behavior would be premature, as it would not consider the possibil-
ity that she has acted rationally after all (in view of information unknown 
to an outside observer, for instance). But the central question remains 
unanswered: of what nature is the relation between the two objectives in 
decision theory, if such a relation exists?
Anand argues that the two objectives are mutually exclusive approaches 
to decision-making processes (Anand, 1990: 92) – one pursues either the 
descriptive or the normative objective, but it is impossible to pursue both 
at the same time or only partially. As a result, to simultaneously solve both 
objectives literally amounts to ‘squaring the circle’ (Anand, 1990: 100) – 
it would be tautologically false and hence contradictory. Such a position, 
however, undermines the interdependence of the objectives and thus the 
very reason for testing axioms in the first place. Doing so begs the question 
of Anand’s own project. But it is not my intention to enter the century-old 
discussion of induction and deduction here. The upshot is that Anand’s 
dichotomy is too strict, too rigid, and deeply unrealistic with regard to any 
concrete decision-theoretic take on choice behavior. What I mean with 
this claim shall be shown by returning to Anand’s translation theorem.
3.2 The Translation Theorem revisited 
According to Anand, choice primitives should not be described ex post. 
Instead, we should follow the normative objective and determine our 
‘linguistic conventions’ with respect to the choice primitives prior to the 
observation of the choice. What we can postulate about the decision-mak-
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ing process beforehand, or ex ante, is basically that a choice has to be made 
– a decision must be taken in order to have something to assess in the first 
place. In doing so, presumably, we could not say anything about what 
underlying preference, considerations, or motivation will lead the agent to 
her final decision, because we would be unable to make sure that we have 
enumerated all the underlying motivational considerations of the choice 
set. Such an approach would be descriptively satisfying only if the agent was 
merely influenced by the bare observable outcome and commonly known 
information thereof11. However, this is unlikely to be the case in situations 
which interest us here: we would not be able to consider the possibility of 
c* in Jane’s example even if we realized later on that she was in possession 
of the particular information that turned c into c*. To follow a strict and 
rigid normative ex ante requirement in Jane’s case – that is, to focus merely 
on the eventual decision and hence not differentiating between c and c* 
– would be descriptively deeply unsatisfactory. However, it is not clear 
why allowing c* would be so problematic on a normative-deductive level. 
Could there not be a middle-ground between the objectives? 
In fact, Anand himself seems to imply an interconnection between the 
objectives. For him, axioms in themselves are empty (Anand, 1990: 98). 
They need to be applied to a domain via defined relations. Indeed, how 
and where axioms like transitivity are supposed to apply is the crux of the 
matter. On this basis, primitive construction in itself (and re-description 
thereof ) is not so much the issue at stake; it might even be a rather use-
ful tool in testing, for instance, outcomes of experiments (Anand, 1990: 
98-99). According to Anand, we need to make sure that the primitives 
have ‘substantive meaning’ and a non-empty behavioral content (Anand, 
1990: 99). This is how we can define and clarify the primitives and their 
relations to the domain. So, how do we determine the relevant informa-
tion in the choice set of economic agents in order to obtain primitives with 
‘substantive meaning’? 
To do this, we simply need to specify and describe a choice primitive 
such that it holds for the specific decision-making process of the agent. 
The description of the choice primitive has to correspond to the grounds 
on which the agent makes her decision and has thus to encompass the 
relevant motivational basis of the decision maker. By motivational I mean 
the set of considerations, beliefs and thoughts that make the agent take 
a decision. It is the set of factors that lead her to the conviction of act-
ing on reasoned grounds. It is in virtue of this motivational basis – and 
with regard to this basis only – that an observer can legitimately assess 
the rationality of an action. Those reasons make the decision rational or 
not. An act is not rational by chance or because certain unconsidered or 
unknown factors happen to make an act or choice appear rational. A choice 
is not rational if it is identical to what a rational person would have chosen. 
It is rational if the ‘right’ and rational reasons have led the person to make 
that decision12.
Consequently, we need to get the description right with regard to 
the agent’s perception of the choice – this is the criterion that saves the 
description from being arbitrary. I admit that we hereby jettison a strictly 
‘hands-off’ requirement because the underlying motivation might not be 
directly observable and thus not defined ex ante. However, I am not saying 
that the requirement is useless per se. In fact, the previously mentioned 
legitimate basis for assessing the rationality of agents itself represents a 
hands-off requirement. Basing this assessment only on the motivational 
grounds of an agent is less strict and more encompassing. Pace Anand, this 
focus on motivational grounds is not necessarily problematic, as we shall 
see now.
3.3 The impact on decision theory
Allowing for a re-description of the choice primitive after the fact need not 
be a problem so long as we base the re-description of the choice primitives 
on evidence external to the decision theorist, the experimenter herself, or 
the observer in general. This is based on the assumption that a direct influ-
ence of the investigating subject on its object of study needs to be avoided 
or controlled for. But beyond that point, we do not need to restrict our-
selves unnecessarily from finding an action’s real motive. The grounds of 
action might not be the directly observable: in Jane’s case, her apparent 
choice for c would have been considered irrational if we had not allowed 
for a broader scope, involving her underlying motivation. Indeed, our 
primary focus is what leads the agent to her decision and not so much 
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what this ultimate choice is. Whatever the grounds for the decision are, 
these grounds need to serve as the final answer to the question whether a 
choice has been rational or not. Rationality is attributed to the underlying 
decision-making process of the agent; her choice is merely the output and 
result of this process. 
Our aim in this paper has been to show that there is a possibility to 
preserve the axiomatic method and transitivity despite the challenge of 
experimental results. Let me now briefly address a major charge against 
this view. To describe the choice primitives in terms of the motivational 
reasons or beliefs of the agent might seem quite natural. But the former 
are not necessarily directly observable. This not only poses a problem con-
cerning the proper observation and categorization of these motivations 
but also has problematic consequences for the demands on the observer 
or experimenter. 
Whereas the first issue can be dealt with technically (by refining meth-
ods such as surveys or experiments, or finding appropriate proxies, etc.), 
the second issue goes deeper. It aims at current problems like data min-
ing, that is, the selective interpretation and treatment of data to confirm a 
specific preconceived conclusion. Is it possible for the experimenter to not 
at all influence the social experiment? Admittedly, our benchmark is less 
demanding than what is required by current standards in rational choice 
theory (that is, strict ‘hands-off’). However, we have seen in the previ-
ous sections that a benchmark of objectivity that satisfies the ‘hands-off’ 
criterion perfectly is rather unrealistic. Involvement of the experimenter 
is unavoidable, as can be seen in issues of, for instance, framing experi-
ments13. It is a matter of degree, and one may criticize our account for 
giving too much leeway to this involvement. The complete absence of 
involvement desired by those critics, however, should be given up, since it 
is an illusion.
Let us return to Jane in order to consider some preconditions under 
which our account of re-description is likely to be successful. What if Jane 
reconstructs or invents a rational choice after the fact? She might be intel-
ligent enough to make up a story that makes her prima facie intransitive 
decision appear rational after all. Here, the decision theorist will have to 
roll up her sleeves, soil her hands, and conduct an investigative case-by-
case study asking whether Jane’s new story makes sense. Furthermore, the 
experimenter would have to take a clear stand. Firstly, by openly defining 
and defending a normative benchmark of rationality by which behavior is 
assessed. Secondly, by eliciting a transparent criterion for the appropriate 
translation or (re-)description of the choice. 
By loosening up the ‘hands-off’ requirement and allowing the experi-
menter to be involved we can still address issues of obvious contradictions 
in preferences. For alluding to the motivational grounds of an action does 
not bar us from assessing such cases on a normative level. Our bench-
mark of rationality and transitivity (or whatever other axioms we posit) 
still applies. If it turns out that Jane simply enjoys violating axioms, and, 
moreover, our c* has never been the case or was deliberately neglected 
by Jane – then there is no reason not to frame her ultimate decision as 
irrational according to the benchmark. Evidently, at the end of the day it 
all depends on our definition of rationality. This, in turn, depends on the 
axioms we endorse beforehand to determine what we mean by rational-
ity. Questioning an overly standardized understanding and application of 
rationality or doubting its underlying axioms, as done by Anand and oth-
ers, is a desirable endeavor. However, we need not throw out the baby with 
the bath-water and by dismissing transitivity altogether. Nor do we have 
to chuckle less about Jane’s anecdote.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we looked at the puzzle of transitivity focusing on the 
example of Jane: is her intransitive choice to take the cheese cake neces-
sarily irrational? We suggested a re-description of her choice according to 
motivationally salient considerations as a way to preserve transitivity. We 
argued against Anand’s claim that any re-description is ultimately arbitrary, 
by showing that observable choice is not the sole criterion for describing 
preferences. Furthermore, we suggested that Anand’s argument is based 
on an overly strict distinction between descriptive and normative decision 
theory. In our view, both approaches are interrelated. On such an account, 
we are no longer bound to a strong and fruitless dichotomy between ques-
tioning intuitive axioms and accepting irrationality on a large scale.
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Notes
1. This anecdote is attributed to Sidney Morgenbesser as a case of violating the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives. We shall presently adapt and use the anecdote for our 
purposes of discussing transitivity.
2. Dietrich & List (2009) model an agent’s preferences as influenced by ‘motivational 
salient dimensions’ of options. Evidently, the present approach is inspired by their account 
but not necessarily perfectly congruent with it.
3. Anand (2009) endorses the validity of the claims in his 1990 article.
4. All following, not further documented references relate to Anand (1990).
5. The contextualization in the present paragraph is mine and not literally found in Anand 
(1990).
6. I adapted Allais’ findings to our example and neglected framing issues for the present 
purpose.
7. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and Loomes & Sugden (1982), most seminally, extended 
on this ‘Allais paradox’. Both of these stand in a tradition of gradually eroding the impor-
tance of transitivity in economic modelling.
8. Although we do not deal with them, accounts of rational choice that relativize or waive 
transitivity are acknowledged (cf. Anand (2009) and Hansson & Grüne-Yanoff (2011) for 
a representative list).
9. Although Anand argues against this conception, it underlies my own argument in par-
ticular in section 3.2.
10. Cf. Mandler (2005) for a detailed account of the nature of this relationship.
11. This implicit assumption of Anand is clearly inspired by the broadly shared behavioral 
framework among economists involving ‘revealed preferences’: whatever the agent chooses 
is what she de facto prefers. Our alternative and contrastive account, in turn, is inspired 
by Davidson (1974) or Sen (1977) and focuses on internal states as determinants of pre-
ferences.
12. Evidently, such an account involves several controversial philosophical premises – epis-
temological internalism or world-mind dualism, to provide some labels. Although I will 
not be able to deal with these considerations here, my aim is reached if I can show that there 
are argumentations that avoid Anand’s dismissal of transitivity.
13. The matter her is, in a nutshell, that the way choices are described, presented and 
framed by the theorist has an influence on how people act despite the fact that the objective 
probabilistic outcomes are identical. This is analogous to Allais’ (1953) or Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) findings.
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